Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?

Jahr: 2020

Typ: Journal Publication

Fachzeitschrift: Journal of Public Economics

Open Science:

Bronze

Abstract

We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits.

Veröffentlichungsinformationen

TRR 266 researchers

Elisa Casi-Eberhard Norwegian School of Economics

Barbara Stage WHU

External researchers

Christoph Spengel

Volume Number

190

DOI

DOI Link

Open Science

To cite this article

Casi-Eberhard, E., Spengel, C., & Stage, B. (2020). Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over? Journal of Public Economics, 190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104240

Zugehörige Projekte

B07

Costs and Benefits of Tax Transparency

+ 10

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln und der Leibniz Universität Hannover, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.