No. 152: Too complex to cooperate? – Tax complexity and cooperative compliance

Jahr: 2024
Typ: Working Paper

Abstract

This study investigates whether, how, and under what conditions the expected positive association be-tween cooperative compliance programs and tax compliance is attenuated by tax complexity. Many countries have implemented cooperative compliance programs to improve compliance, however, the effectiveness of these programs varies across countries. I expect and find that the complexity of a coun-try’s tax system might impair the compliance-enhancing impact of cooperative compliance programs. Using cross-country data of 57 countries, I find that cooperative compliance programs generally pro-mote compliance, except in countries with highly complex tax codes. Moreover, these programs are positively associated with tax compliance even if tax procedures, such as tax filing and payment or tax audits, are highly complex. My findings suggest that cooperative compliance programs can compensate for mistrust caused by complex tax procedures and enhance compliance. However, they may not be effective tools to enhance compliance in complex tax codes.

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln und der Leibniz Universität Hannover, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.

WordPress Cookie Plugin von Real Cookie Banner