No. 77: Wait, what? The consequences of not disclosing feedback-stimulating information

Jahr: 2022

Typ: Working Paper

Open Science:

Bronze

Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that managers use voluntary CAPEX guidance to stimulate market feedback by incentivizing informed trading in their stock prices. We show a related decrease in nondisclosing firms‘ informed trading measures. The reduction in informed trading is pronounced in unexpected nondisclosure, consistent with the interpretation that traders perceive nondisclosure as indicating low gains from informed trading. Less informed trading is associated with a reduction in investment-q sensitivity and future performance for nondisclosing firms. Overall, we document a novel link between managers‘ strategic disclosure decisions, the feedback channel, and real effects.

Veröffentlichungsinformationen

TRR 266 researchers

Tanja Keeve

External researchers

Matthias Lassak

DOI

DOI Link

Open Science

To cite this article

Keeve, T., & Lassak, M. (2022). Wait, what? The consequences of not disclosing feedback-stimulating information. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 77. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4040976

Zugehörige Projekte

B10

Corporate Transparency and Unstructured Soft Information: Measurement and Effects

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln und der Leibniz Universität Hannover, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.