No. 152: Too Complex to Cooperate? Tax Complexity and Cooperative Compliance

Year: 2024
Type: Working Paper

Abstract

This study investigates whether, how, and under what conditions the expected positive association between cooperative compliance programs and tax compliance is attenuated by tax complexity. Many countries have implemented cooperative compliance programs to improve compliance, however, the effectiveness of these programs varies across countries. I expect and find that the complexity of a country’s tax system might impair the compliance-enhancing impact of cooperative compliance programs. Using cross-country data of 57 countries, I find that cooperative compliance programs generally promote compliance, except in countries with highly complex tax codes. Moreover, these programs are positively associated with tax compliance even if tax procedures, such as tax filing and payment or tax audits, are highly complex. My findings suggest that cooperative compliance programs can compensate for mistrust caused by complex tax procedures and enhance compliance. However, they may not be effective tools to enhance compliance in complex tax codes.

Participating Institutions

TRR 266‘s main locations are Paderborn University (Coordinating University), HU Berlin, and University of Mannheim. All three locations have been centers for accounting and tax research for many years. They are joined by researchers from LMU Munich, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Goethe University Frankfurt, University of Cologne and Leibniz University Hannover who share the same research agenda.

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